In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
Abstract
If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical that statements that can express true propositions or contingently false propositions should nevertheless seem absurd like this. If we can account for the absurdity, we shall solve Moore’s Paradox. In this chapter, we shall look at Moore’s proposals and more recent discussions of Moorean absurd thought and speech.
Keywords Assertion  Moore's Paradox  Epistemic Norms
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.

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