Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159 (2013)
AbstractIf evidence is propositional, is one’s evidence limited to true propositions or might false propositions constitute evidence? In this paper, I consider three recent attempts to show that there can be ‘false evidence,’ and argue that each of these attempts fails. The evidence for the thesis that evidence consists of truths is much stronger than the evidence offered in support of the theoretical assumptions that people have relied on to argue against this thesis. While I shall not defend the view that evidence is propositional, I shall defend the view that any propositional evidence must be true
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Citations of this work
The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.
Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2019 - Analysis 79:52-61.
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References found in this work
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.