Authors
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
Abstract
My contribution to the author meets critics discussion of Pritchard's _Epistemological Disjunctivism_. In this paper, I examine some of the possible motivations for epistemological disjunctivism and look at some of the costs associated with the view. While Pritchard's view seems to be that our visual beliefs constitute knowledge because they're based on reasons, I argue that the claim that visual beliefs are based on reasons or evidence hasn't been sufficiently motivated. In the end I suggest that we'll get all the benefits with none of the costs of epistemological disjunctivism if we accept E=K.
Keywords Epistemological Disjunctivism  Reasons for Belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/jpr201672277
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Pritchard’s Reasons in Advance.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):86-104.
Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.
Disjunctivism.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
Disjunctivism and Skepticism.Huaping Wang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):443-464.
Either/Or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-19.
Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):434-455.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-09-03

Total views
326 ( #24,175 of 2,410,230 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #25,215 of 2,410,230 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes