Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology

Hypatia 10 (3):117 - 137 (1995)
Abstract
I develop two different epistemic roles for emotion and desire. Caring for moral ends and people plays a pivotal though contingent role in ensuring reliable awareness of morally salient details; possession of various emotions and motives is a necessary condition for autonomous understanding of moral concepts themselves. Those who believe such connections compromise the "objective" status of morality tend to assume rather than argue for the bifurcated conception of reason and affect this essay challenges.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00740.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle - 1999 - Courier Dover Publications.
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design. [REVIEW]Sabine Roeser - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):103-115.
“Screw You!” & “Thank You”.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.
On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism.Jonathan Smith - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.
Muslim‐American Scripts.Saba Fatima - 2013 - Hypatia 28 (2):341-359.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Moral Judgment and Emotions.Kyle Swan - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):375-381.
Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-13.
Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total downloads
79 ( #68,438 of 2,193,296 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #95,890 of 2,193,296 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature