Hypatia 10 (3):117 - 137 (1995)

Abstract
I develop two different epistemic roles for emotion and desire. Caring for moral ends and people plays a pivotal though contingent role in ensuring reliable awareness of morally salient details; possession of various emotions and motives is a necessary condition for autonomous understanding of moral concepts themselves. Those who believe such connections compromise the "objective" status of morality tend to assume rather than argue for the bifurcated conception of reason and affect this essay challenges.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00740.x
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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Citations of this work BETA

“Screw You!” & “Thank You”.Coleen Macnamara - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):893-914.
Emotional Engineers: Toward Morally Responsible Design. [REVIEW]Sabine Roeser - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):103-115.
Science’s Immunity to Moral Refutation.Alex Barber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):633-653.

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