Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths

In Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Springer Verlag (2018)
Clayton Littlejohn
King's College London
According to the Path Principle, it is permissible to expand your set of beliefs iff (and because) the evidence you possess provides adequate support for such beliefs. If there is no path from here to there, you cannot add a belief to your belief set. If some thinker with the same type of evidential support has a path that they can take, so do you. The paths exist because of the evidence you possess and the support it provides. Evidential support grounds propositional justification. The principle is mistaken. There are permissible steps you may take that others may not even if you have the very same evidence. There are permissible steps that you cannot take that others can even if your beliefs receive the same type of evidential support. Because we have to assume almost nothing about the nature of evidential support to establish these results, we should reject evidentialism.
Keywords Knowledge-First Epistemology  Enkratic Requirement  Rational Requirements  Anti-Evidentialism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Contextualism About Evidential Support.Jessica Anne Brown - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):329-354.
The Enkratic Requirement.Allen Coates - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
A Defense of Objectivism About Evidential Support.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):716-743.
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
Siegel on the Rationality of Science.Brian S. Baigrie - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (3):435-441.
Necessarily Adequate Evidence About Other Minds.T. Greenwood - 1972 - Philosophy 47 (182):359 - 370.
Evidence and the Openness of Knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.


Added to PP index

Total views
89 ( #75,390 of 2,309,276 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #19,945 of 2,309,276 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature