Abstract
In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to reject the idea that strong evidential support is the stuff rationality is made of. In the course of doing this, I shall argue that there is a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about and explain how this can be.
Keywords Akrasia  Epistemic Akrasia
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12271
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.
Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.
Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality.Ru Ye - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):93-108.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
A Puzzle About Reasons and Rationality.Caj Strandberg - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):63-88.
Unifying the Requirements of Rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.
Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-09-06

Total views
1,307 ( #3,141 of 2,433,133 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
66 ( #10,893 of 2,433,133 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes