The Unity of Reason

In Clayton Littlejohn John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion (forthcoming)
Abstract
Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve even that
Keywords Justification  Excuse  Epistemic Norms  Knowledge First  Knowledge and Practical Reason  Moral Uncertainty  Normative Uncertainty  Enkratic Requirement
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Should Have Known.Sanford C. Goldberg - forthcoming - Synthese:1-32.

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