In Clayton Littlejohn John Turri (ed.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion (forthcoming)
Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve even that
|Keywords||Justification Excuse Epistemic Norms Knowledge First Knowledge and Practical Reason Moral Uncertainty Normative Uncertainty Enkratic Requirement|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.
Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.
Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press.
Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason.Pauline Kleingeld - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
Added to index2012-09-30
Total downloads648 ( #1,805 of 2,158,133 )
Recent downloads (6 months)63 ( #3,481 of 2,158,133 )
How can I increase my downloads?