Xiaofei Liu
Xiamen University
This paper is an attempt to improve the practical argument for beliefs in God. Some theists, most famously Kant and William James, called our attention to a particular set of beliefs, the Jamesian-type beliefs, which are justified by virtue of their practical significance, and these theists tried to justify theistic beliefs on the exact same ground. I argue, contra the Jamesian tradition, that theistic beliefs are different from the Jamesian-type beliefs and thus cannot be justified on the same ground. I also argue that the practical argument, as it stands, faces a problem of self-defeat. I then construct a new practical argument that avoids both problems. According to this new argument, theistic beliefs are rational to accept because such beliefs best supply us with motivation strong enough to carry out demanding moral tasks
Keywords The practical argument  William James  Moral motivation
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-015-9517-2
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References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Belief in Kant.Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Arguments for the Existence of God.Peter Byrne - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Arguments for the Existence of God.Peter rne - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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