Utilitas 24 (1):63-81 (2012)

Xiaofei Liu
Xiamen University
Philosophers debate over the truth of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing harm to happen. Deontologists tend to accept this doctrine, whereas consequentialists tend to reject it. A robust defence of this doctrine would require a conceptual distinction between doing and allowing that both matches our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases and enables a justification for the alleged moral difference. In this article, I argue not only that a robust defence of this doctrine is available, but also that it is available within a consequentialist framework
Keywords Doing and Allowing
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0953820811000380
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Abortion and Infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.
The Theory of Morality.Alan Donagan - 1977 - University of Chicago Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Death Sentences.Christopher Miles Coope - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (1):5-32.
The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing.Samuel C. Rickless - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):555-575.
The Moral Status of Enabling Harm.Samuel C. Rickless - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):66-86.
A Defence of Absurd Theories in Economics.Ole Røgeberg & Morten Nordberg - 2005 - Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (4):543-562.


Added to PP index

Total views
6,591 ( #222 of 2,403,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
933 ( #229 of 2,403,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes