Confirming idealized theories and scientific realism


Abstract
Two types of idealization in theory construction are distinguished, and the distinction is used to give a critique of Ron Laymon's account of confirming idealized theories and his argument for scientific realism.
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Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247.
Truthlikeness.Ilkka Niiniluoto & David Pearce - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (2):281-290.
The Rationality of Science.David Christensen & W. H. Newton-Smith - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):471.
Likeness to Truth.Graham Oddie - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1):296-297.
Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism.Thomas Weston - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):53-74.

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