Yang Liu
Cambridge University
The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that, for a given pair of events, one event may be considered “more probable” than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, e.g., lack of robust statistical information. We take that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This paper provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.
Keywords Bayesian Decision Theory  Subjective Probability  Sure-thing Principle  Comparative Probability  Qualitative Probability
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axaa009
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel. pp. 233--261.

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