Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):147-162 (2021)

Michelle Liu
University of Hertfordshire
It is often thought that sensible qualities such as colours do not exist as properties of physical objects. Focusing on the case of colour, I discuss two views: the Galilean view, according to which colours do not exist as qualities of physical objects, and the naive view, according to which colours are, as our perception presents them to be, qualities instantiated by physical objects. I argue that it is far from clear that the Galilean view is better than the naive view. Given the arguments in this paper, the naive view ought to be taken seriously. The discussion here appeals especially to theorists who, like Goff, are already convinced that the quantitative language of physical science fails to capture all qualities
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Consciousness Everywhere? Essays on Panpsychism.Philip Goff & Alex Moran - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):9-15.
Grounding the Qualitative: A New Challenge for Panpsychism.Alex Moran - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):163-180.

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