The daoist conception of truth: Laozi's metaphysical realism vs. zhuangzi's internal realism


Authors
JeeLoo Liu
California State University, Fullerton
Abstract
In this paper, I shall present a comparative study of two leading Daoists’ different conceptions of truth in the context of modern metaphysical debate on realism and antirealism. My basic contention in this paper is that both Laozi and Zhuangzi embrace the realist's thesis that the world is largely independent of us and the way we are; it has its own objective nature.
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