Synthese:1-27 (forthcoming)

Authors
Vassilis Livanios
University of Cyprus
Abstract
The Identity Theory of properties is an increasingly popular metaphysical view that aims to be a middle way between pure powerism and pure categoricalism. This paper’s goal is to highlight three major difficulties that IDT should address in order to be a plausible account of the nature of properties. First, although IDT needs a clear definition of the notion of qualitativity which is both adequate and compatible with the tenets of the theory, all the extant proposals fail to provide such a definition. Second, the suggested definitions of qualitativity are characterised by a metaphysical ‘neutrality’ that threatens to trivialise the important metaphysical debate regarding the question whether properties confer by themselves dispositions on their bearers or need the ‘assistance’ of laws of nature to do that. Finally, none of the extant alternative understandings of the core identity-claim of IDT can adequately meet the objection that the claim in question is unintelligible.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-03016-0
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Scientific Essentialism.Brian Ellis - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
The Universe as We Find It.John Heil - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Laws in Nature.Stephen Mumford - 2002 - Routledge.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.D. M. Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.

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