Daniel Z. Korman
University of California at Santa Barbara
Jonathan Livengood
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
We present an explanatory objection to Norton's material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.04.004
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An Explanationist Account of Genealogical Defeat.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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