Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):500-519 (2018)

Authors
Vassilis Livanios
University of Cyprus
Abstract
_ Source: _Page Count 20 Tugby and Yates have recently argued that immanent realism is incompatible with the existence of intrinsic but relationally constituted genuine dispositional properties. The success of Tugby’s and Yates’ arguments depends either on a strong or on a weak assumption about the interworld identity of dispositional properties. In this paper, the author evaluates the strength of the arguments in question under those two assumptions. He also offers an alternative metaphysical picture for the fundamental dispositional properties which rejects these assumptions and, consequently, undermines the arguments themselves.
Keywords identity of properties   immanent universals   intrinsic powers  relational constitution
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1163/18756735-000050
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Nature’s Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Powers: A Study in Metaphysics.George Molnar (ed.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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