Abstracta 6 (1):3-17 (2010)

Metaphysicians who hold that there is an ontological distinction between two kinds of fundamental natural properties assume that properties are dispositional or non-dispositional necessarily. In contrast to this, I suggest that one can admit the existence of fundamental contingently dispositional properties. After some clarifications concerning the content of the suggested view, I respond to several objections regarding its intelligibility and viability and outline two of its important consequences
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References found in this work BETA

Nature’s Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
Dispositions. [REVIEW]John W. Carroll - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):82-84.

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