Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (8):901-921 (2020)

Authors
Federica Liveriero
Universita' degli Studi di Pavia
Abstract
This article defends a specific account of reasonableness as a virtue of liberal citizenship. I specify an account of reasonableness that I argue is more consistent with the phenomenology of intersubjective exchanges among citizens over political matters in contexts of deep disagreement. My reading requires reasonable citizens to undertake an attitude of epistemic modesty while deliberating public matters with agents who hold views different from theirs. In contrast with my view, I debate Martha Nussbaum’s and Steven Wall’s accounts of reasonableness and specify why I believe that these proposals, although interesting, both require revisions. Distinguishing my account from theirs, I specify the normative relation between reasonableness and a general framework of political legitimacy that identifies citizens as ‘co-authors of democratic decisions’. Here, I argue that the liberal ideal of ascribing to each member of the constituency the status of putative epistemic authority can be properly fulfilled if coupled with a correct specification of the political ideal of mutual respect. I conclude claiming that opacity respect, a notion of respect according to which the recognition respect that is owed to individuals is expressed by the idea that we have to treat them as ‘opaque’, is the most adequate concept of political respect when dealing with interpersonal deliberations at political level in contexts of deep disagreement.
Keywords epistemic modesty  liberal legitimacy  opacity respect  perfectionism  reasonableness
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1177/0191453720903492
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,577
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Liberalism Without Perfection.Jonathan Quong - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Political Liberalism by John Rawls. [REVIEW]Philip Pettit - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):215-220.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Liberal Perfectionism and the Virtues.Michele Mangini - 2019 - In Elisa Grimi, John Haldane, Maria Margarita Mauri Alvarez, Michael Wladika, Marco Damonte, Michael Slote, Randall Curren, Christian B. Miller, Liezl Zyl, Christopher D. Owens, Scott J. Roniger, Michele Mangini, Nancy Snow & Christopher Toner (eds.), Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. Springer. pp. 147-163.
The Epistemic Dimension of Reasonableness.Federica Liveriero - 2015 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):517-535.
Editorial.Judith Suissa & Darren Chetty - 2018 - Ethics and Education 13 (1):1-3.
Political Disagreement, Legitimacy, and Civility.David Archard - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (3):207 – 222.
Democratic Reasonableness.Thomas A. Spragens - 2008 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):193-214.
The Limits Of Citizenship In Aristotle's Politics.C. Woods - 2014 - History of Political Thought 35 (3):399-435.
Reasonable, Agonistic, or Good?: The Character of a Democrat.Allyn Fives - 2009 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (8):961-983.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-04-25

Total views
10 ( #870,181 of 2,446,650 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #456,908 of 2,446,650 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes