Radical Non-dispositionalism and the Permutation Problem

Axiomathes 24 (1):45-61 (2014)
Abstract
Radical non-dispositionalism is the view according to which the actual causal/nomic roles of natural properties are totally irrelevant to their de re modal representation. The major difficulty besetting all forms of radical non-dispositionalism is that the latter allegedly allows the metaphysical possibility of two natural properties swapping their actual causal/nomic roles. The aim of this paper is to provide a plausible solution to that problem. To this end, I describe the necessary steps that a proponent of the view may take to respond to it. I argue that those steps include the rejection of the transworld existence of natural properties and the adoption of a counterpart-theoretic framework for their de re modal representation. I, finally, present two versions of the property-counterpart framework which are consistent with the radical non-dispositionalism
Keywords Non-dispositionalism  Worldbound properties  Counterpart theory  Permutation difficulty
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-013-9209-4
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From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
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