Axiomathes 22 (1):147-169 (2012)
In this article I deal with the notion of observation, from a phenomenologically motivated point of view, and its representation mainly by means of the formal language of quantum mechanics. In doing so, I have taken the notion of observation in two diverse contexts. In one context as a notion related with objects of a logical-mathematical theory taken as registered facts of phenomenological perception ( Wahrnehmung ) inasmuch as this phenomenological idea can also be linked with a process of measurement on the quantum-mechanical level. In another context I have taken it as connected with a notion of temporal constitution basically as it is described in E. Husserl’s texts on the phenomenology of temporal consciousness. Given that mathematical objects as formal-ontological objects can be thought of as abstractions of perceptual objects by means of categorial intuition, the question is whether and under what theoretical assumptions we can, in principle, include quantum objects in abstraction in the class of formal-ontological objects and thus inquire on the limits of their description within a formal-axiomatical theory. On the one hand, I derive an irreducibility on the level of individuals taken in formal representation as syntactical atoms-substrates without any further content and on the other hand a transcendental subjectivity of consciousness objectified as a self-constituted temporal unity upon which it is ultimately grounded the possibility of generation of an abstract predicative universe of discourse
|Keywords||Ego of consciousness Individual Intentionality Non-separability Quantum measurement Quantum object Temporal continuum|
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References found in this work BETA
Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis.Steven French - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory.David Bohm - 1993 - Routledge.
Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):5-26.
Identity and Individuality in Quantum Theory.Steven French - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Citations of this work BETA
Are Mathematical Theories Reducible to Non-Analytic Foundations?Stathis Livadas - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):109-135.
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