The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology

Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59 (1996)
Authors
Abstract
The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our psychology, it must also replace them for purposes of the evaluation of our theories and explanations, psychological and otherwise. This paper briefly reviews eliminativist arguments for doubting the correctness of sentential accounts of explanation, understanding, and normative evaluation. It then considers Paul Churchland's (1989) proposed alternative norms, which are framed neurocomputationally. The alternative is found wanting in several specific ways. The arguments for eliminating propositionally-based norms are then re-examined and it is suggested that the need for wholesale elimination is overstated. A clear gap in the traditional epistemological story is identified, however, and a more modest set of norms is proposed as a way of filling this gap, rather than as a way of entirely replacing the traditional framework
Keywords Computation  Epistemology  Mind  Neural  Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09515089608573172
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,932
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.R. Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Explaining Learning: From Analysis to Paralysis to Hippocampus.John Clark - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):667–687.
Explaining Learning: From Analysis to Paralysis to Hippocampus.John Clark - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):667-687.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Normative Naturalism.Larry Laudan - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):44-59.
Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind.Kristin Andrews - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):433-448.
Is 'Normative Naturalism' an Oxymoron?Ellen R. Klein - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):287 – 297.
Normative Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):53 – 78.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
21 ( #285,404 of 2,272,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #85,956 of 2,272,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature