Substantive, a Posteriori, Type Disjunctivism

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:165-170 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Disjunctivism in philosophy of perception maintains that whereas veridical perceptions are relational states involving objects of the external world, illusions and hallucinations are non-relational states of the subjects. Veridical and non veridical perceptions could be subjectively indistinguishable, but this fact would not be able to support fundamental psychological explanations. Disjunctivism has to face some important problems. The aim of this paper is to explore a peculiar elaboration of disjunctivism able to face them. Our proposal intends to be substantive, offering a counterfactual explanation of the differences between veridicaland non veridical perceptions. We will arrive to an a posteriori disjunctivism for some relevant types of perceptual experiences. The a posteriori character of our position will be consequent with the external nature of the intentional objects of veridical perceptions. But our disjunctivism will be concerned only with types of perceptual experiences. That way, it could make room for many sorts of internalist psychological explanations in the context of a general disjunctivist approach.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.
Disjunctivism. HTML::Element=HASH(0x55e425c05ef8) - 2009 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tyler Burge on disjunctivism.John McDowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
On being alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism.Juan Comesaña - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
Disjunctivism, indistinguishability, and the nature of hallucination.William Fish - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167.
Disjunctivism and skepticism.Huaping Wang - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):443-464.
Experience and Introspection.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 175-220.
Silencing the Argument from Hallucination.István Aranyosi - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Either / or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94.
McDowell’s disjunctivism and other minds.Anil Gomes - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):277-292.
The openness of illusions.Louise Antony - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-04

Downloads
61 (#269,722)

6 months
9 (#352,597)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references