Valorar Algo Porque Podría Ser Valorado

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 49:135-140 (2008)
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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze a way of valuing positively something which rarely has been taking into account in the literature: to value positively something because it could be valued positively by someone else. The main features of that way of valuing something are really very suggesting. Here, we would not have instrumental valuations, nor valuations directly sensitive to intrinsic values either. However, there would be cases in which valuations made in that way would make us able to detect things that can be valued in an inconditional way. When we imagine or conceive what could be value positively, our motivational structures face us with something that is valued without evaluative conditions and, therefore, with something that is a good candidate to have an intrinsic value.

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