Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models

Philosophy of Science 77 (5):971–984 (2010)
Abstract
Recent philosophical attention to climate models has highlighted their weaknesses and uncertainties. Here I address the ways that models gain support through observational data. I review examples of model fit, variety of evidence, and independent support for aspects of the models, contrasting my analysis with that of other philosophers. I also investigate model robustness, which often emerges when comparing climate models simulating the same time period or set of conditions. Starting from Michael Weisberg’s analysis of robustness, I conclude that his approach involves a version of reasoning from variety of evidence, enabling this robustness to be a confirmatory virtue..
Keywords climate models  confirmation  empirical support  robustness  variety of evidence
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DOI 10.1086/657427
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References found in this work BETA
How Models Are Used to Represent Reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
Robustness Analysis.Michael Weisberg - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):730-742.
Some Varieties of Robustness.Jim Woodward - 2006 - Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (2):219-240.
Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
The Robust Volterra Principle.Michael Weisberg & Kenneth Reisman - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (1):106-131.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemology of Climate Models and Some of its Implications for Climate Science and the Philosophy of Science.Joel Katzav - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):228-238.
Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58-68.
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw008.
Scientific Models.Stephen M. Downes - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):757-764.

View all 24 citations / Add more citations

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Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling.Wendy S. Parker - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):233-249.
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Some Varieties of Robustness.Jim Woodward - 2006 - Journal of Economic Methodology 13 (2):219-240.
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