Mind and Meaning

Cambridge University Press (1981)
Is linguistic meaning to be accounted for independently of the states of mind of language users, or can it only be explained in terms of them? If the latter, what account of the mental states in question avoids circularity? In this book Brian Loar offers a subtle and comprehensive theory which both preserves the natural priority of the mind in explanations of meaning, and gives an independent characterisation of its features. It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no available choice Will maximise satisfaction of all of them. Prevailing accounts of rational decision making in such contexts asume that, once all factors are taken into consideration, the decision maker will reach a single ranking of his values, resolving the conflict between them.
Keywords Meaning (Philosophy  Belief and doubt  Mind and body  Desire (Philosophy
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Reprint years 1982, 1986
Buy the book $12.80 used (72% off)   $183.13 new    Amazon page
Call number B105.M4.L6
ISBN(s) 0521229596     9780521338264
DOI 10.2307/2184590
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The Psychology of Folk Psychology.A. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):15-28.

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