Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62 (1972)
Frege and quine notwithstanding, Some singular terms in belief contexts have normal reference but do not admit truth-Preserving substitution of co-Referential terms. The conditions of a sentence's being true of a sequence of referents may be partially determined by its singular terms; substitution may change those conditions, While preserving genuine reference. On one reading, 'n believes that f is g' is true iff n believes of the f that it is the f and is g
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