Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent-causation and event-causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive and mechanistic accounts of human behaviour (Sect. IV). For the two to be compatible it is necessary that, e.g., intentions and brain states be not merely co-existent but also causal equivalents, in a way which allows for the mechanical explanation of teleological states — or vice versa.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747408601712
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Explanation and Understanding.G. H. von Wright - 1971 - Cornell University Press.
Action and Purpose.Richard Taylor - 1966 - New York: Humanities Press.
The Conceivability of Mechanism.Norman Malcolm - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (January):45-72.
Free Action.Abraham I. Melden - 1961 - Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Willing, Trying and Doing.Michael Gorr - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):237 – 250.

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