Constitutivism and cognitivism

Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3705-3727 (2022)
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Abstract

Constitutivism holds that an account of what a thing is yields those normative standards to which that thing is by nature subject. We articulate a minimal form of constitutivism that we call _formal, non-epistemological constitutivism_ which diverges from orthodox versions of constitutivism in two main respects. First: whereas orthodox versions of constitutivism hold that those ethical norms to which people are by nature subject are sui generis because of their special capacity to motivate action and legitimate criticism, we argue that these features are compatible with treating these norms as of a piece with those ‘formal’ natural-historical norms which can be used to assess living things. Second: unlike orthodox versions of constitutivism, our version does not seek to use a non-normative account of that kind of being which we are as a means of identifying those normative claims to which we are are by nature subject. We then indicate how our position can afford us the resources to address some of the familiar difficulties that face cognitivism in ethics.

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Author Profiles

Jennifer Ryan Lockhart
Auburn University
Thomas Lockhart
Auburn University

References found in this work

Natural goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.

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