Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148 (2003)
This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account. Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception--in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose--or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes. The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception--the position of Alfred Mele. In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception--not by any means all. Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches
|Keywords||Depth Psychology Self-deception Unconscious Psychodynamic|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action.Ernest R. Hilgard - 1977 - Wiley.
The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):627-40.
Citations of this work BETA
Self-Deception and Shifts of Attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
Similar books and articles
Self-Deception and the Limits of Folk Psychology.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):1-13.
Defending Intentionalist Accounts of Self-Deception.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):107-108.
Self-Deception, Rationality, and the Self.Thomas Sturm - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):73-95.
Critical Notice.Kent Bach - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele.Robert Audi - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads195 ( #21,697 of 2,164,654 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #26,206 of 2,164,654 )
How can I increase my downloads?