Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom

London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and the aforementioned argument for a libertarian conception of free will. In defending each of these arguments, the book both defends and relies upon the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In articulating the latter transcendental argument – for freedom – heavy reliance is made on the earlier, epistemic, work: especially on the deontological conception of rational justification (on epistemic internalism).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Access Internalism and the Guidance Deontological Conception of Justification.Ram Neta - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):155-168.
Two Notions of Scientific Justification.Matthias Adam - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):93 - 108.
Epistemic Responsibility.Stephen Hetherington - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):398-414.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-16

Downloads
32 (#516,416)

6 months
165 (#21,512)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

View all 213 references / Add more references