Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom

London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This is a work concerned with justification and freedom and the relationship between these. Its summational aim is to defend a transcendental argument for free will – that we could not be epistemically justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will would be required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. The book advances two transcendental arguments – for a deontically internalist conception of epistemic justification and the aforementioned argument for a libertarian conception of free will. In defending each of these arguments, the book both defends and relies upon the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In articulating the latter transcendental argument – for freedom – heavy reliance is made on the earlier, epistemic, work: especially on the deontological conception of rational justification (on epistemic internalism).



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,743

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the general argument against internalism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):147 - 153.
The Free Speech Argument against Pornography.Caroline West - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):391 - 422.
Two Notions of Scientific Justification.Matthias Adam - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):93 - 108.
Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
A dilemma for internalism?Thomas M. Crisp - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):355-366.
Epistemic freedom.J. David Velleman - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.


Added to PP

116 (#116,295)

6 months
7 (#129,004)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.
Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72.
Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):55-78.
Can Self-determined Actions be Predictable?Amit Pundik - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):121-140.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.

View all 213 references / Add more references