Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):719-734 (2014)

Matthew Lockard
Southern Methodist University
Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.
Keywords Implication  Reasoning  Simulation
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2012.730040
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References found in this work BETA

Folk Psychology as Simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
Folk Psychology.Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 35-71.
Empathy, Mind, and Morals.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):17 - 41.

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