Singer on killing and the preference for life

Abstract
According to Singer, it is not directly wrong to kill 'non-self-conscious beings', such as lower animals, human foetuses and newborn infants, provided that any consequent loss of happiness is made good by the creation of new sentient life. In contrast, normal adult humans, being 'self-conscious', generally have a strong preference for going on living, the flouting of which cannot, Singer argues, be morally counterbalanced by creating new, equally happy individuals. Singer's case might be reinforced by taking account, not only of the preference for continued life itself, but also of other preferences for whose satisfaction continued life is essential. It proves difficult, however, to find a formulation of 'preference utilitarianism' which, while lacking other obviously unacceptable consequences, supports Singer's 'non-replaceability principle'. Also, Singer's position fails adequately to accommodate our conviction that the lives of human beings are, in general, more valuable than those of other animals. Finally, his thesis that lower animals (let alone human infants) are replaceable, has decidely counterintuitive implications.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747908601870
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References found in this work BETA
Abortion and Infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.
Abortion and the Golden Rule.R. M. Hare - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (3):201-222.

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Citations of this work BETA
Death is a Welfare Issue.James W. Yeates - 2010 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):229-241.
What is Speciesism?Oscar Horta - 2010 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
Non-Human Rights: An Idealist Perspective.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1984 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 27 (1-4):439 – 461.
Utilitarian Killing, Replacement, and Rights.Evelyn Pluhar - 1990 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 3 (2):147-171.
Utilitarian Killing, Replacement, and Rights.Evelyn Pluhar - 1990 - Journal of Agricultural Ethics 3 (2):147-171.

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