Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54 (2014)
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Abstract |
Certain philosophers maintain that there is a ‘constitutive threshold for belief’: to believe that p just is to have a degree of confidence that p above a certain threshold. On the basis of this view, these philosophers defend what is known as ‘the Lockean Thesis ’, according to which it is rational to believe that p just in case it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p above the constitutive threshold for belief. While not directly speaking to the controversy over the Lockean Thesis, this paper defends the general idea behind it—namely, the thesis that there is some threshold such that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence great than that threshold. This paper identifies the threshold in question—not with the alleged constitutive threshold for belief—but with what I call ‘the practical threshold for rational belief’. Roughly, the thesis defended here is that it is rational to believe that p if and only if it is rational to have a degree of confidence that p that rationalizes engaging in certain types of practical reasoning.
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Keywords | belief credence degree of belief Lockean Thesis threshold threshold account of belief knowledge and practical reasoning practical reasoning treating as true rational belief |
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Reprint years | 2014 |
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DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2013.858421 |
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References found in this work BETA
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
View all 35 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
What Does Decision Theory Have to Do with Wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.
View all 22 citations / Add more citations
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