Studia Leibnitiana 38 (2):177 - 196 (2006)
In a recent paper, Dennis Plaisted examines an important argument that Leibniz gives for the existence of primitive concepts. After sketching a natural reading of this argument, Plaisted observes that the argument appears to imply something clearly inconsistent with Leibniz’s other views. To save Leibniz from contradiction, Plaisted offers a revision. However, his account faces a number of serious difficulties and therefore does not successfully eliminate the inconsistency. We explain these difficulties and defend a more plausible alternative. In the process, we call attention to the neglected topic of Leibniz’s views on the nature of conceiving, and reveal his commitment to the somewhat surprising thesis that one can conceive something through a concept even if one has no conscious grasp of that concept.
|Keywords||Leibniz concepts conceiving consciousness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Leibniz's Argument for Primitive Concepts.Dennis Plaisted - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (3):329-341.
Citations of this work BETA
Leibniz and the Veridicality of Body Perceptions.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (5).
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