Integrating Hume's accounts of belief and justification

Abstract
Hume’s claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined---though without his remarking on this fact---with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume’s view, are steady dispositions , nature’s provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume’s epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief’s influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise
Keywords Hume  belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00104.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,122
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Hume's Reason.David Owen - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
54 ( #99,576 of 2,191,297 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #95,454 of 2,191,297 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature