Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303 (2001)
Hume’s claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined---though without his remarking on this fact---with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume’s view, are steady dispositions , nature’s provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume’s epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief’s influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise
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References found in this work BETA
A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.
Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume’s Argument About Induction.E. Loeb Louis - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321-338.
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