Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133 (2013)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have a hallucination can be exactly like what it’s like to have a veridical experience, that it cannot explain why the hallucination I have in the bad case is subjectively indistinguishable from the kind of experience I have in the good case, and that it cannot offer a viable account of the nature of hallucination. -/- In this paper, I argue that a proper formulation of disjunctivism can avoid these objections. Disjunctivism should be formulated as the weakest claim required to preserve its primary motivation, viz., Naïve Realism—the view that veridical experience fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving entities in her environment. And the weakest claim required to preserve Naïve Realism allows for many sorts of commonalities across the good and hallucinatory cases, commonalities that can be marshaled in responding to the objections. Most importantly, disjunctivism properly formulated is compatible with “positive” accounts of the nature of hallucination.
|
Keywords | disjunctivism Naive Realism |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 0031-8205 |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00502.x |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 43 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.
Husserl on Hallucination: A Conjunctive Reading.Matt E. Bower - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):549-579.
View all 13 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press. pp. 221-254.
The Causal Argument Against Disjunctivism.Michael Sollberger - 2007 - Facta Philosophica 9 (1):245-267.
Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination.William C. Fish - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 144--167.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
Silencing the Argument From Hallucination.István Aranyosi - 2013 - In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press). MIT Press.
The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.
Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism.Michael Sollberger - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2011-07-12
Total views
829 ( #6,034 of 2,421,630 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #15,243 of 2,421,630 )
2011-07-12
Total views
829 ( #6,034 of 2,421,630 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #15,243 of 2,421,630 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads