Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.

Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):302-307 (2016)
Authors
Artūrs Logins
University of Geneva
Abstract
According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about evidence.
Keywords functions of evidence  E=K  evidential probability  probability raising
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