Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270 (2018)

Authors
Artūrs Logins
University of Zürich
Abstract
A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.
Keywords contextualism about normative reasons  deliberation  epistemology of reasons  normative reasons  possession of reasons  reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1002/tht3.395
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.
Having Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.
Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.
Converging on Values.Donald C. Hubin - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):355–361.
Normative Reasons and Theism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2018 - Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
Contrastive Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence?Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):720-727.
Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.
How Reasons Are Sensitive to Available Evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.
Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press.
Motivating Reason to Slow the Factive Turn in Epistemology.J. Drake - forthcoming - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-22.
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
Sources, Reasons, and Requirements.Bruno Guindon - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
Reasons for Emotion and Moral Motivation.Reid Blackman - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827.
Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-11-13

Total views
88 ( #110,072 of 2,386,589 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #33,560 of 2,386,589 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes