Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492 (2020)

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Artūrs Logins
University of Zürich
Abstract
This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01378-x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert H. Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

Graded Epistemic Justification.John Hawthorne & Artūrs Logins - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1845-1858.

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