Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237 (2012)

Authors
Heather Logue
University of Leeds
Abstract
Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00332.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rethinking Naive Realism.Ori Beck - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):607-633.
VII—Naive Realism and Diaphaneity.Craig French - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):149-175.
Hallucination And Imagination.Keith Allen - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):287-302.
Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).

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