Is Incompleteness A Serious Problem?

Abstract
whole numbers that manages to assert that it itself is unprovable (from a given finite set F of axioms using formal logic). (Gödel's paper is included in the well-known anthology [1].) GF : ``GF cannot be proved from the finite set of axioms F.'' This assertion GF is therefore true if and only if it is unprovable, and the formal axiomatic system F in question either proves falsehoods (because it enables us to prove GF) or fails to prove a true assertion (because it does not enable us to prove GF). If we assume that the former situation is impossible, we conclude that F is necessarily incomplete since it does not permit us to establish the true statement GF.
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