The doctrine of temporal parts and the "no-change" objection

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):365-372 (1994)
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The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is to undermine both Heller's argument in favor of DTP and his response to that criticism



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Lawrence Lombard
Wayne State University

Citations of this work

Persistence in Time.Damiano Costa - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Time for Change.Timothy A. Johnson - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):497-513.
Esistenza e Persistenza.Damiano Costa - 2018 - Milan, IT: Mimesis.

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