Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):365-372 (1994)
The Doctrine of Temporal Parts (sometimes abbreviated herein as 'DTP') asserts that, for each portion (including infinitely small portions) of the smallest period of time during which a material object exists, there is an object-a temporal part of the material object in question-which exists at that and at no other time. In "Things Change," Mark Heller offers an argument for DTP, and responds to a objection, the "No-Change" objection, to that doctrine.2 My goal in this paper is to undermine both Heller's argument in favor of DTP and his response to that criticism
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Temporally Localised Facts and the Problem of Intrinsic Change.Frank Hofmann - 2005 - Ratio 18 (1):39–47.
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