Time for a change : a polemic against the presentism/eternalism debate

In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This chapter elaborates on an intuitive criterion much discussed by ancient Greek philosophers regarding the conditions under which an object can be said to change. Heraclitus and Parmenides both denied the possibility of change. Heraclitus believed that changes are constantly occurring. Consequently, he needed to sever the connection between the idea that a thing changes and the idea that a change occurs, a connection expressed by the claim that a change occurs just in case a thing changes. Heraclitus was a temporal parts theorist; therefore, to accept his view means abandoning the idea that the things that come into and go out of existence are also things that can alter. Parmenides, on the other hand, believed that nothing can become what it is not; therefore, nothing can change.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

57 (#274,471)

6 months
10 (#257,583)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lawrence Lombard
Wayne State University

Citations of this work

Defining Existence Presentism.Jonathan Charles Tallant - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):479-501.
What is temporal ontology?Natalja Deng - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):793-807.
A foundation for presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1809–1837.
Temporal existence and temporal location.Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1999-2011.
Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references