Perdurantism, fecklessness and the veil of ignorance

Philosophical Studies:1-12 (forthcoming)

Authors
Michael Longenecker
Wuhan University
Abstract
There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion that we are morally obliged to be feckless. I argue that this charge critically overlooks the epistemic situation—what I call the ‘veil of ignorance’—that perdurantists find themselves in. Though the veil of ignorance still requires an alteration of our commonsense understanding of the demands on action, I argue for two conclusions. The first is that the alteration that is required isn’t a moral one, but rather an alteration of prudential reasoning. Second, and more importantly, this alteration isn’t necessarily a repugnant one. In fact, given that it prudentially pushes one towards greater impartiality, it may be seen as a point in favor of perdurantism.
Keywords Perdurantism  Four-dimensionalism  Personite  Impartiality  Fecklessness  Temporal Parts
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01326-9
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References found in this work BETA

How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):137-49.
How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.
Epistemology and Cognition.Fred Dretske - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (5):265-270.

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