Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):233-253 (1998)

This essay suggests the possibility of conceiving the transcendental synthesis of imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as the understanding at work on sensibility by developing an active conception of identity according to which the distinction between the imagination and the understanding is merely nominal. Aristotle's philosophy is shown both to provide such a conception of identity and to be tacitly at work in Kant's thinking. Finally, the essay traces this position into the discussion of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment
Keywords Kant  understanding  imagination  Critique of Pure Reason
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1998.tb01754.x
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