Empirical equivalence in the Quine-Carnap debate

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508 (2006)

Authors
Eric J. Loomis
University of South Alabama
Abstract
Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, and I argue that it is difficult to find a perspective from which Quine can criticize Carnap in a non-question-begging way.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00273.x
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. QUINE - 1960 - MIT Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Pursuit of Truth.W. V. QUINE - 1990 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Artificial Language Philosophy of Science.Sebastian Lutz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):181–203.
Quine Against Lewis on Truth by Convention.Sean Morris - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.

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