Synthese 121 (3):291-307 (1999)
This article critically examines Saul Kripke's (1972) argument for the separability of necessary truths from truths known a priori, focusing on his criticism of the standard meter case presented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to show that Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of several readings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalist account of necessary truth is then considered in the light of the standard meter example.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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