Necessity, the a priori, and the standard meter

Synthese 121 (3):291-307 (1999)

Authors
Eric J. Loomis
University of South Alabama
Abstract
This article critically examines Saul Kripke's (1972) argument for the separability of necessary truths from truths known a priori, focusing on his criticism of the standard meter case presented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to show that Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of several readings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalist account of necessary truth is then considered in the light of the standard meter example.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1005229326821
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,461
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Define a Unit of Length.Jakub Mácha - forthcoming - 9th National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy. Truth, Knowledge, and Science, 2010.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Kripke and the Standard Meter.Norman Malcolm - 1981 - Philosophical Investigations 4 (1):19-24.
The Standard Meter by Any Name is Still a Meter Long.Heather J. Gert - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):50-68.
Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
The Contingent a Priori: Kripke's Two Types of Examples.Heimir Geirsson - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):195 – 205.
How to Define a Unit of Length.Jakub Mácha - forthcoming - 9th National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy. Truth, Knowledge, and Science, 2010.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
118 ( #71,590 of 2,286,400 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #417,385 of 2,286,400 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature