In the Eye of the Beholder

In Julian Dodd (ed.), Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie. Oxford: pp. 223-340 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to a core tenet of contemporary philosophy, aesthetic properties are primarily represented in experiences. Obviously, however, the tenet does not apply in any straightforward manner to many items that nevertheless seem to have aesthetic properties. Examples include literary works, mathematical objects, scientific ideas, and works of conceptual art. Aesthetic properties need not be represented in perceptual experiences, but what is an experience if not a perceptual state? This paper adapts Fred Dretske’s distinction between analogue and digital representation to develop a broad conception of a kind of state that is an experience but need not be perceptual. Aesthetic properties are primarily represented in states so conceived.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,466

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
Aesthetic Properties, History and Perception.Sonia Sedivy - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (4):345-362.
Peter Lamarque’s Aesthetic Essentialism.Mona Roxana Shields - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Reading
Normativity and Generality in Ethics and Aesthetics.Robert Audi - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):373-390.
Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception.Mette Kristine Hansen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):860-863.
VI—Gist!Tim Bayne - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):107-126.
Visuality and Aesthetic Formalism.Branko Mitrović - 2018 - British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (2):147-163.
The Affective Experience of Aesthetic Properties.Kris Goffin - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):283-300.
Non-Perceptual Aesthetic Properties: Comments for James Shelley.Noël Carroll - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (4):413-423.
Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-07

Downloads
1 (#1,489,356)

6 months
1 (#417,143)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dominic McIver Lopes
University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

The Affective Experience of Aesthetic Properties.Kris Goffin - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):283-300.
How Do We Differ When We Differ in Tastes?Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references