Nonhuman Animals and Epistemic Injustice

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper, I argue that nonhuman animals can be subject to epistemic injustice. I consider Miranda Fricker’s account of the harm of epistemic injustice and highlight that it requires a knower to be invested in being recognized as a knower. I argue that a turn away from a focus on testimony and concepts toward a consideration of the consequences of the distribution of epistemic resources can allow us to consider how epistemic injustice interacts with another form of knowledge: know-how. Here, feminist philosophy and feminist naturalized epistemology can help us understand how social and material conditions can unjustly affect the distribution of these resources among communities of nonhuman animals. Despite not having an investment in being recognized as knowers, nonhuman animals can be subject to epistemic injustice when their acquisition of know-how is disrupted. I draw from work in animal ethology and movement ecology to argue that distributive epistemic injustice wrongs nonhuman animals by hindering their ability to acquire 'answers' to 'questions' they have an interest in answering, namely, acquiring true beliefs about conspecifics and their environment, behaviors and skills that enable everyday successful coping, and information for the distributed cognition involved in group decision-making.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Revisiting Epistemic Injustice in the Context of Agency.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):703-706.
Nonhuman animal property: Reconciling environmentalism and animal rights.John Hadley - 2005 - Journal of Social Philosophy 36 (3):305–315.
Nonculpably Ignorant Meat Eaters & Epistemically Unjust Meat Producers.C. E. Abbate - 2020 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (9):46-54.
Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2021 - Tandf: Social Epistemology 35 (6):564–576.
A Third Conception of Epistemic Injustice.A. C. Nikolaidis - 2021 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 40 (4):381-398.


Added to PP

112 (#116,067)

6 months
112 (#8,977)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Andrew Lopez
Queen's University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references