Authors
Errol Lord
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his own lights or giving up his view's central tenet. At the end, I will suggest a view similar to Dancy’s that avoids the dilemma.
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v2i3.120
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.
On the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - 2014 - Dissertation, New Brunswick Rutgers

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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