Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason

Abstract
It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his own lights or giving up his view's central tenet. At the end, I will suggest a view similar to Dancy’s that avoids the dilemma.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,126
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties.Bart Streumer - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336.
Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism.Moad Omar Edward - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):112-116.
Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons. [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):429–435.
The Real Direction of Dancy’s Moral Particularism.Edmund Wall - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):587-612.
Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism.Guy Fletcher - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
Reasons and Psychological Causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Acting in Ignorance.Jonathan Dancy - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):345-357.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-29

Total downloads

226 ( #16,586 of 2,171,878 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #76,305 of 2,171,878 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums