Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7 (2008)
It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his own lights or giving up his view's central tenet. At the end, I will suggest a view similar to Dancy’s that avoids the dilemma.
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No Reason for Identity: On the Relation Between Motivating and Normative Reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.
Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry Into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons.Susanne Mantel - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
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